Calgary teacher claims discrimination after facing mandatory vaccination or termination
A Calgary teacher who resigned rather than get a COVID-19 shot has lost her discrimination case, with an Alberta judge ruling that her diagnosed anxiety disorder did not legally prevent her from being vaccinated.
In a decision dated April 9, 2026, Justice N.E. Devlin of the Court of King's Bench of Alberta dismissed the teacher's judicial review application against Calgary French & International School Society (CFISS), upholding the Alberta Human Rights Commission's earlier dismissal of her complaint.
The application was dismissed without costs.
Vaccine mandate introduced
The individual was hired as a probationary teacher in April 2021, and in late September 2021, CFISS introduced a COVID-19 vaccination policy requiring proof of immunization before entering the workplace. Employees not yet fully vaccinated had a grace period through the end of October, subject to ongoing rapid testing.
Employees who did not present proof of full vaccination by Nov. 1, 2021 were to be placed on unpaid leave, and terminated if they did not comply by the end of that month. The policy included a medical exemption, but only for employees whose physicians confirmed a severe allergic reaction or myocarditis from a previous vaccination. The teacher did not assert she fell within either category.
She sought an exemption on mental health grounds. CFISS anonymously reviewed and denied her request because it did not meet the Alberta Health Services COVID-19 Scientific Advisory Group guidelines.
The teacher resigned six days later, on Oct. 19, 2021, and filed a human rights complaint on Oct. 25, 2021, alleging discrimination based on mental disability.
Medical push for accommodation
In support of her exemption request, the teacher provided letters from two registered psychologists, both diagnosing her with generalized anxiety disorder. The second letter, authored by Lynne Goertzen in October 2021, recommended she "be supported in her request for consideration of exemption from mandatory vaccination to retain her employment."
Justice Devlin found the letters fell short of what was needed.
"Neither letter stated that the applicant was unable to receive the vaccine nor the expected scope, scale, or nature of the impact upon her if she were to get it," he wrote, noting the second letter observed the teacher was actively engaged in therapy and able to use "counselling strategies" to manage symptoms.
The judge observed that the teacher continued working successfully until her resignation.
"In simple terms, there was no evidence before the director, or the chief's delegate, that the applicant was 'unable' to receive a vaccine," Devlin wrote, characterizing the Goertzen letter as "asking for 'support' to make the applicant's life less anxiety-ridden, rather than describing limits on, or acute adverse outcomes flowing from, her patient taking the COVID-19 vaccine."
Lack of proof of disability
Devlin held that the chief's delegate reasonably concluded the teacher was not disabled from complying with the vaccine requirement, and "did not act unreasonably in treating the applicant's decision not to get vaccinated as a choice, albeit one informed by the psychological unpleasantness she would experience if she did."
Adopting an articulation drawn from prior AHRC jurisprudence (Hart v Condominium Corporation No. 831 0969 and Pelletier v 1226309 Alberta Ltd.), the judge reiterated the documentation standard: "An individual seeking an accommodation under the Act, must, at a minimum, provide medical information certifying a disability, provide the general nature of the disability and set out the nature and scope of the limitations flowing from the disability."
The decision also leans on the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Stewart v Elk Valley Coal Corp, which Devlin treated as binding authority requiring a complainant to show functional inability to comply with a neutral workplace rule.
In dismissing the application, Devlin concluded: "The chief's delegate reasonably dismissed the complaint for failing to establish a functional inability to comply with the workplace requirement of vaccination. Without that, the mere fact that the requirement coincided with her anxiety disorder to an unknown degree was insufficient to establish a case of prima facie discrimination."