Ignorance is risk: Lessons from Volpi v. Lifemark Health Corp.

On Feb. 18, 2026, the Human Rights Tribunal of Alberta released its decision in Volpi v Lifemark Health Corp, a case that provides important clarification regarding an employer’s duty to inquire and accommodate employees with mental disabilities.

Most notably, the Tribunal confirmed that where objective indicators suggest a resignation may be connected to a disability, an employer must pause and make reasonable inquiries before accepting the resignation at face value.

On June 17, 2026, the Tribunal issued its decision on remedy, ordering the employer to pay more than $1 million in damages.

Time-off request denied

David Volpi provided services as a physiotherapist for Lifemark Health Corp. at its Village Square Sport Physiotherapy clinic in Calgary, for roughly 16 years. He had diagnosed mental disabilities, including Bipolar II Disorder.

In or around 2008–2009, Volpi experienced a significant mental health episode that resulted in his hospitalization. At that time, he disclosed his mental health condition to the clinic director, and an informal arrangement was established whereby he could request and take time off when his mental health was deteriorating, which allowed him to successfully continue working for several years.

In 2015, a new clinic director assumed responsibility for the clinic and began addressing a number of issues involving Volpi, including insurance company complaints, patient complaints, scheduling practices, etc. Although these issues were addressed in a manner that the Tribunal ultimately found appropriate, Volpi’s mental health deteriorated later in 2015 and into 2016.

Throughout this period, Volpi repeatedly requested time off, advising the clinic director that “something was wrong” and that he required time away “to deal with his mental health and avoid a full relapse.” He also offered to provide a medical note but was told not to bother because the vacation schedule was already set.

Volpi was granted leave in December 2015–January 2016 and again for one week in July 2016. After returning from the July leave, he requested additional time off. The clinic director advised that additional summer leave was not possible due to scheduling constraints and requested further justification for approving an extended absence. Volpi was ultimately told he could take leave beginning Oct. 1, 2016.

Letter of resignation

On Sept. 30, 2016, the day before his leave was to begin, Volpi abruptly submitted a hastily typed, two-line letter of resignation. On the basis of medical and expert evidence before the Tribunal, it was established that Volpi had been in a hypomanic state (a symptom of his Bipolar II Disorder) when he made the decision to resign.

Although the clinic director testified that he was “shocked” by the resignation, his only response was to ask whether anything could be done to change Volpi’s mind. No inquiry was made into whether his resignation was connected to his mental health or whether any accommodation was required.

When Volpi left the workplace, he did not take his personal belongings or take any steps to notify patients or arrange to have them seen by other physiotherapists. Later on Sept. 30, 2016, he emailed the former clinic director to let him know that he had resigned.

Then, on Oct. 7, 2016, while in Italy, he received an email from an administrative staff member asking that he confirm his resignation and suggesting that the clinic director was not pleased about the lack of notice given. The complainant perceived this as a threat of potential action against him.

On Oct. 8, 2016, in an email to the clinic director’s supervisor,  Volpi advised that he would not be returning, filled him in on the issues he had with the clinic director in getting his leave approved, and noted that the reasons for him leaving were “multiple and complex.”

Volpi never received a response to his email, nor was he asked about his mental health status or decision to resign.

Return to work requested

On Oct. 20, 2016, upon his return from Italy, Volpi spoke with the clinic director about returning to work and advised that he had been hospitalized following his resignation. In response, the clinic director advised that he would have to apply online. Again, there was no inquiry into Volpi’s mental health or his decision to resign, nor was there an offer to rescind the acceptance of his resignation or to re-employ him.

Thereafter, Volpi entered a period of escalating depression and was ultimately hospitalized in March 2017. Following his release from the hospital, he contacted the former clinic director to tell him of his hospitalization, his mental health struggles, and to inquire if there was any way he could get his position at the clinic back.

Volpi subsequently filed a complaint with the Alberta Human Rights Commission alleging that he had been discriminated against on the ground of mental disability contrary to the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, because it had failed to accommodate his mental health needs, delayed his leave request, improperly accepted his resignation without making proper inquiries, and created a toxic work environment.

Tribunal’s decision

The complaint was upheld in part on the merits with the Tribunal finding that Lifemark had discriminated against Volpi:

• by delaying his ability to take time off in the summer of 2016 despite objective signs that his request was disability-related
• by accepting his resignation without inquiring into whether it was connected to his mental disability and without meaningfully considering accommodation.

The Tribunal dismissed Volpi’s complaints relating to harassment, improper patient diversion, and a toxic work environment, finding that the evidence did not support these claims or establish that there was an adverse impact connected to his mental disability.

 In contrast, the Tribunal found that the inability of Volpi to take time off when he requested was an adverse impact because he was requesting leave due to his mental health and because “history had taught him that was what was required to manage the symptoms of his disability.” The Tribunal noted that the inability to take time off when he requested it was “clearly connected” to his mental disability.

Duty to inquire

Practically, and in most cases, an employee will disclose a disability and request accommodation (an employer cannot be expected to accommodate what it doesn’t know about or understand). However, even if the employee does not self-disclose and seek accommodation, an employer has a duty to inquire where it knows, or reasonably ought to know, that the conduct of the employee that may lead to adverse action is connected to a disability.

The Tribunal emphasized that determining when the duty arises is highly fact-specific, but common triggers include:

• noticeable changes in behaviour
• signs of emotional distress
• circumstances suggesting disability may explain performance or conduct issue
• disciplinary or termination decisions where disability may be involved.

The Tribunal referenced the framework applied in Kvaska v Gateway Motors (Edmonton) Ltd, 2020 AHRC 94, which asks:

• Did the disability contribute to the employee’s conduct?
• Did the disability impair the employee’s ability to comply with workplace rules?
• Did the employer know or reasonably ought to have known about the connection before taking adverse action?

In Volpi’s circumstances, the Tribunal adapted this framework to the circumstances of a leave request and resignation. The Tribunal found that the proper questions to assess the duty to inquire in this case were:

• Was the employee’s disability a reason for the request for time off?
• Did the employer know, or reasonably ought to have known, that the request was disability-related?

The Tribunal concluded that both questions were answered yes.

In this case, the Tribunal found that Volpi’s mental disability was the reason he requested time off. The Tribunal further found that Lifemark knew or ought to have known that Volpi’s request for leave and his resignation were connected to his disability.

The Tribunal found that the clinic director knew:

• Volpi was experiencing and exhibiting signs of stress and burnout
• Volpi had just returned from one week off and had immediately asked for additional time off, which he tied to something being wrong and his mental health
• Volpi told him he had dealt with the former clinic director with similar requests for time off in the past
• the clinic director had been in meetings where the former clinic director made reference to Volpi’s dealings with stress
• Volpi raised the possibility of getting a medical note to support his leave.

The Tribunal rejected the clinic director’s view that Volpi was simply experiencing normal workplace stress, noting that while stress alone may not constitute a disability, it does not mean that “workplace stress cannot impact existing disabilities or that an existing disability cannot impact an employee’s reaction to workplace stress.”

Critically, the Tribunal found that the clinic director was not in a position to make that assessment, particularly given the other objective indicia present.

Key takeaways for HR

Based on the Tribunal’s reasoning, there are several steps Lifemark could and should have taken once objective indicators of Volpi’s disability appeared.

• The Tribunal found that when Volpi asked for additional leave in the summer of 2016, Lifemark should have investigated whether the request was disability-related.
• The Tribunal specifically noted that if the employer had properly engaged its duty to inquire, it perhaps “would have requested and received medical information justifying the complainant’s requested leave.”
• The Tribunal held that the employer should have paused and investigated Volpi’s mental state before accepting the resignation, given the surrounding circumstances.
• The Tribunal explicitly said the employer “could have refused to accept the resignation right away…paused and inquired into the complainant’s mental health and asked for medical information depending on what the complainant advised in that regard.”
•  The Tribunal emphasized that Lifemark had multiple opportunities after the resignation to inquire further but did not do so.
• The Tribunal noted that Lifemark never put forward any “evidence that it ever turned its mind to whether the complainant was in need of accommodation for his disability either at the time of his request for a leave, when he submitted his resignation, or in its discussions with the complainant thereafter.”
• Because a previous clinic director knew about Volpi’s disability and past accommodations, the employer should have ensured that this information was properly retained and communicated within the organization.

In the Tribunal’s view, whether the clinic director knew the full details of Volpi’s diagnosis was irrelevant. Rather, the question was whether Lifemark knew or ought to have known. The Tribunal noted that an employer cannot fail to ensure there are proper processes in place for collecting and sharing disability- and accommodation-related information and then later assert ignorance as a defence.

The remedy

On June 17, 2026, the Tribunal released its remedy decision in Volpi v Lifemark Health Corp, 2026 AHRC 71. It ordered Lifemark to pay $40,000 in general damages for injury to dignity and $965,338 in damages for lost wages, together with prejudgment interest running from Oct.1, 2016. The total monetary award therefore exceeds $1 million before interest.

The Tribunal also issued a systemic remedy, ordering Lifemark to ensure that it maintains an accommodation policy for its Village Square location that is communicated to all supervisory employees and that sets out a process for assessing and implementing accommodation needs and supports.

In awarding $40,000 in general damages, the Tribunal stressed that the discrimination was objectively serious because the employer’s conduct:

• was particularly devastating in terms of the complainant’s dignity and self-respect
• contributed to the decline in  Volpi’s mental health that ultimately led to his hospitalization
• caused significant humiliation and adversely impacted his self-confidence
• resulted in negative and lasting repercussions on familial relationships.

As for lost wages, the parties agreed that Volpi was entitled to $267,397 for the roughly nine-month period during which he was without work after his resignation. The real dispute was whether anything was owing once he began new employment with another clinic in July 2017.

Lifemark argued that no further wage loss was payable, in part because Volpi had not proven that a medical restriction permanently prevented him from earning at his former level. The Tribunal rejected that argument. It held that the proper question was not whether Volpi had a permanent medical restriction, but rather what Volpi would have earned but for the discriminatory loss of his employment.

On that basis, the Tribunal awarded the difference between what Volpi earned and what he would have earned had he remained employed by Lifemark.

This remedy decision underscores that the financial consequences of a failure to inquire can be severe. Employers may face lost income damages spanning many years, general damages for injury to dignity, prejudgment interest accumulating over a lengthy period, and systemic remedies requiring prospective compliance.

The substantial award in this case should serve as a reminder that the costs of failing to accommodate — or failing to inquire when accommodation may be required — can be significant.

Practical implications for employers

This decision serves as an important reminder that employers must be vigilant about recognizing potential signs of mental health issues in the workplace. Where there are objective indicators that an employee’s conduct may be connected to a mental disability, employers should pause and make appropriate inquiries before making decisions that could adversely affect the employee.

Importantly, the duty to inquire may arise even where the signs of disability are subtle or could be mistaken for ordinary workplace stress – particularly where additional contextual factors are present, such as a history of accommodation, references to burnout, or offers to provide medical documentation.

Employers should also ensure that information regarding employees’ disabilities and accommodation needs is properly documented and communicated to relevant personnel. The Tribunal’s reasoning makes clear that organizational knowledge is attributed to the employer and a change in supervisory personnel does not reset the employer’s obligations or excuse a failure to pass on critical accommodation-related information.

Finally, employers should approach employee resignations with appropriate caution. Where the surrounding circumstances suggest a resignation may be connected to a disability (e.g., it is abrupt, out of character, or occurs in the context of ongoing mental health concerns), the appropriate course is to pause, inquire, and consider whether accommodation obligations may be engaged before accepting the resignation at face value.

If you have any questions regarding the duty to inquire, disability-related accommodation obligations, or the legal risks associated with accepting an employee’s resignation in complex circumstances, please do not hesitate to contact a member of our Employment and Labour Team.

Both at Stikeman Elliott, Gary Clarke is a partner and head of the Employment & Labour Group in Western Canada, and Stephan Lazarenko is an associate in the Employment & Labour Group.

 This article was first published on Stikeman Elliott LLP’s Knowledge Hub and originally appeared at www.stikeman.com. All rights reserved.

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