Worker overwhelmed by powerful release of gas and liquid from pipeline; Unlikely extra precautions would have changed outcome
A tragic incident in which a Saskatchewan worker was quickly overwhelmed and killed by poisonous gas wasn’t reasonably foreseeable and couldn’t have been prevented by the employer, the Saskatchewan Provincial Court has ruled.
Nalco Champion is a global company that provides midstream analysis for the oil and gas industry with a Canadian headquarters in Rocky View, Alta. It provides services to about 50 oilfield companies in Saskatchewan and Manitoba that includes analysis of samples of “produced water” — crude oil extracted from oil wells that contains oil, water, salt, gases, and other substances. Nalco Champion employs a number of sales representatives who took liquid samples of produced water at various client facilities.
One of Nalco Champion’s sales representatives in Saskatchewan was Michael Bunz, 38, who was a respected and experienced employee. On May 22, 2014, Bunz was assigned to an oilfield facility where the oil and gas in produced water was separated in a metal pipeline. Normal practice was to take samples at a pressure gauge or similar point on the pipeline — in this case, it was inside a one-story metal building that covered the pipeline — by using a crescent wrench to loosen the pressure gauge, inserting a spigot, and allowing the liquid to flow into an open jug for sampling.
Early in the morning of May 22, 2014, the facility operator communicated with Bunz and was aware Bunz was coming to take samples. About three hours later, the operator saw Bunz’s truck parked outside the building. When he left his truck, he saw the flashing lights of the facility’s alarm indicating dangerous levels of H2S — a poisonous gas that is the product of the oil pipeline. He also heard a loud hissing noise coming from inside the building.
The operator could smell the odour of H2S gas and looked inside, where he saw liquid streaming upward to the ceiling. He called for assistance and 20 minutes later he and a colleague entered wearing respirators. They found Bunz about five feet away from his sampling point wedged in an alcove. They were unable to remove him until emergency workers arrived. Bunz died at the scene.
An investigation determined that Bunz had left his truck running when he had arrived — sampling by an experienced sales representative such as Bunz usually only took a few minutes. He had loosened the pressure gauge fastener and removed the pressure gauge, which exposed a ball valve that blocks the production water behind it to limit the flow. However, Bunz had accidentally removed the retainer ring for the ball valve because it was worn and difficult to distinguish from the pressure gauge.
There was a small leak, so Bunz had decided to turn off an inlet valve in the alcove behind the header apparatus. However, when he did this, the ball was ejected from the ball valve and a high-pressure stream of production water spouted up to the building’s ceiling. Bunz was quickly overwhelmed by the liquid and the gas that was released.
Company charged following worker death
Following the investigation, Nalco Champion was charged for failing “to take all practicable steps to prevent exposure of a worker, to an extent that it is likely to be harmful to the worker, to a chemical substance or biological substance that may be hazardous as required by subsection 302(2)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulations, 1996 resulting in the death of Michael Bunz and did thereby contravene section 3-78(g) of the Saskatchewan Employment Act.” The charges stemmed from the following allegations:
• Nalco failed to provide Bunz with an approved respirator
• Nalco failed to ensure a second trained and equipped worker was present and communicating with Bunz or that Bunz wasn’t working alone in a remote location
• Nalco failed to ensure Bunz was wearing a personal H2S monitor when taking samples
• Nalco failed to ensure Bunz conducted a hazard assessment before starting or follow the company’s H2S code of practice and personal protective equipment procedures.
The court noted that Bunz, like all Nalco employees, was trained in the use of respirators and had been fitted for an oxygen mask. Usually, employees weren’t required to wear respirators when taking samples unless the client required it and, in this case, the client did not. Whether Bunz was stuck behind the header apparatus or not, a respirator would have given him more time to escape the building before being overwhelmed by the H2S gas. The lack of a respirator meant Nalco may not have done everything reasonably practicable to protect Bunz, said the court.
Precautions unlikely to have made a difference: Court
However, the court found the presence of a second worker wouldn’t have made a difference in the circumstances. Without a respirator, Bunz was overwhelmed quickly and two workers couldn’t remove Bunz from where he was stuck — they had to wait for emergency workers. It was unlikely Bunz wouldn’t have come to harm if he hadn’t been alone, said the court.
The court noted that Nalco provided its sales representatives with personal H2S monitors that could be attached to the breast pocket of the employee’s coveralls. However, company policy allowed them not to wear them if there was a fixed H2S monitor onsite. In this case, there was a monitor and alarm at the building, which went off when the valve breach happened — it was still going off when the facility operator arrived. However, once again, Bunz was overwhelmed so quickly by the valve breach that it didn’t make a difference whether he was wearing a personal monitor or not, said the court.
The court agreed that hazard assessments were common practice and Nalco provided the forms for them to be conducted. There was no evidence Bunz didn’t conduct some form of assessment before entering the building, even though the sampling was a frequent task that took little time. But the court found such a hazard assessment wouldn’t have made a difference if Bunz didn’t identify a complete ball valve failure as a potential hazard — which he didn’t on a previous assessment. The incident would have likely happened regardless of whether a hazard assessment was done, said the court.
The court also found that Nalco’s code of practice indicated respiratory protection wasn’t needed for liquid sampling unless the client required it — only one out of 50 clients required it. In addition, in thousands of liquid samples taken over the years, no one had heard of a powerful H2S release such as that which killed Bunz. There was no indication Bunz didn’t follow the company’s code of practice and it couldn’t anticipate the tragic incident, said the court.
The court noted that Nalco promoted a “culture of discretion” that allowed experienced employees to decide when safety equipment was required and in the wake of Bunz’s death it required all sales representatives to wear respirators when drawing liquid samples.
The court determined that the incident was not foreseeable and Nalco Champion took all reasonable and practicable steps to ensure Bunz’s safety. The charge was dismissed.
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