The employer and the union disagreed over whether a letter of commitment from the airline covered all types of aircraft. The arbitrator found that the language in the letter was specific and excluded some aircraft.
As part of its restructuring, an airline acquired a quantity of propeller aircraft to fly the “feeder” service routes operated by its regional subsidiary under a separate collective agreement.
When the airline awarded the flying of the new aircraft to the subsidiary and its pilots, the union grieved, arguing that a letter of commitment from the employer assigned the flying of the new aircraft to its members.
“Scope” provisions, which restricted both the types and sizes of aircraft and the routes available to the subsidiary and its pilots, were a feature of the collective agreement between the parties.
The potential for the subsidiary to encroach on the routes secured by the union and covered by its collective agreement was an abiding concern for the union — a concern that became more pronounced during restructuring. The union staffed the position of “Scope Chair” to sit on bargaining committees and to administer the scope provisions of the collective agreement.
In the course of the company’s restructuring, which included layoffs and wage concessions, and the employer’s purchase of a number of new aircraft, the union sought assurances with respect to any anticipated changes to the disposition and allocation of routes.
At the time, scope provisions in the collective agreement limited the “feeders” to operating jet aircraft with maximum seating capacity of 55 seats or less. The feeders were also permitted to operate an unlimited number of propeller aircraft with no more than 80 seats. The main airline had not flown propeller aircraft since the 1970s. However, as part of restructuring, the employer intended to employ a number of new 76–110-seat propeller aircraft and allocate the routes according to a competitive bidding process.
Letter of commitment
The employer provided the union with a Letter of Commitment (LOC) addressing the “Allocation of Aircraft between 76 and 110 Seats,” which used both the words “aircraft” and “jets.”
At the union’s insistence, the earlier references in the letter to “aircraft” were substituted in the third paragraph with a reference to “jets.” The letter clarified that the “right to fly the jets between 76 and 110 seats” is vested solely with the union and that the aircraft must be flown according to the union’s seniority list. The LOC also clarified that new (lower) pay rates established according to an earlier letter of understanding would apply.
The employer acquired a number of propeller aircraft in the 76–110-seat range and incorporated them into the subsidiary’s fleet. The union grieved.
The union argued for the enforcement of the plain meaning of the terms in the document. The term aircraft encompassed both jets and propeller aircraft, the union said. Its intent on inserting the reference to “jets” in the LOC was for the purpose of underscoring the contrast between the two types of aircraft and asserting the union’s expansion of its scope to cover all aircraft — jets and turboprops — in the 76–110-seat range.
The LOC was never intended to alter the scope provisions in the collective agreement between the parties and grant the union’s pilots the exclusive right fly the company’s 76–110-seat propeller aircraft, the employer said. Such a significant agreement concerning scope could hardly take place with only one party being aware of it. If the union was intent on altering the language in the LOC with a view to expanding its scope agreements, it would have been incumbent on the union to signal its intent at the time.
“Comfort letter”
The Arbitrator agreed. Even if a narrow reading of the LOC could be lined up behind the union’s case, the argument was overshadowed by the context within which the agreement was negotiated.
“It can reasonably be taken from the foregoing general contextual framework that [the LOC] was a ‘comfort letter’ designed to ally the Union’s fears that [the employer] would side with [the subsidiary] in any future scope dispute with respect to jets and that it had nothing to do with expanding the Union’s scope to encompass propeller aircraft,” the Arbitrator said.
The Arbitrator agreed with the employer that it was very unlikely that such a significant expansion of the union’s scope could take place without it being identified as an issue or discussed.
“Collective bargaining is expected to be a transparent exercise where the parties endeavour to eliminate ‘hidden surprises’ that inevitably lead to costly and disruptive litigation and a deterioration of the union-management relationship,” the Arbitrator said.
In the circumstances, the employer could not reasonably have been expected to understand the union’s stated purpose behind its revision to the LOC.
“I am further satisfied that in these circumstances, of the two competing interpretations, the one advanced by the union is inconsistent with the broad contextual framework while the one advanced by the Employer… is consistent with the broad contextual framework.”
The grievance was dismissed.
