The grievor was responsible for entering production information into a record-keeping program. Finding a supervisor to override the system became a problem, so he found a way to do it himself. The arbitrator overturned his dismissal because he had no intention to be dishonest.
A worker at a highly automated box factory was fired when the employer became convinced that the worker was “massaging” computer production records in order to generate production bonuses for his crew. The union grieved.
Starting part-time at the plant while he was still in high school, S.R. began full-time in 1985. He had more than 24 years of service at the factory when in December 2009 he was fired by the only employer he had ever had.
S.R. was working as “knifeman” at the plant. The job of the knifeman, situated towards the end of the football field-long plant, is to co-ordinate the different automated elements of the process involved in making corrugated cardboard boxes.
The knifeman controls the mix that the boxes are made of and sets the “knife” that cuts the cardboard into the desired sizes and shapes. The knifeman also tracks and co-ordinates the separate jobs and customer orders through the process.
Regular crews operated the factory 24 hours per day. A complicated bonus structure based on crew performance was factored into compensation.
Crews that maximized available production capacity while the process was on-line received bonuses. Down time in excess of 15 minutes that was not attributable to crews was not counted against them.
Through the evolving stages of automation and computerization, S.R.’s crew was perennially a top performer.
The first computer software tracking system allowed the knifeman to amend the computer production records for accuracy.
The next generation of software introduced in 2008 also, initially, allowed the knifeman to make corrections.
Software quirk
The second generation software also had a quirk. It arbitrarily added one minute or more between jobs. This phantom time not only counted against crews for the purposes of calculating bonuses but also had an impact on synchronizing the different aspects of a job.
The software developer showed S.R. how correct these errors.
However, in May 2009 the software developer was instructed by the company to insert a block into the software to prevent anyone other than a supervisor from amending the production records.
The employer’s accounting department had recommended the change to senior management based on its assumption that the only explanation for S.R.’s crew’s performance was that someone had been “massaging” the data.
Neither senior management nor the accounting department had detailed information about how the software worked.
Changes to user profile
While the software block was put in place, alerts or warnings were not built into the system advising that access had been restricted. Nor was it established that any detailed verbal or written warnings were issued with respect to the change to the user access profile for access to production data.
S.R. initially complied with the changes. However, faced with the difficulty of tracking down a supervisor to make constant changes, S.R. eventually found a way around the block and continued to make amendments to the production records as necessary.
On December 16, 2009, S.R. was called into a meeting and asked to explain apparent discrepancies. He was questioned directly about whether or not he had been fixing errors to the records. He initially denied that he had been making such changes. He later admitted to making adjustments to indicate when the plant was offline.
S.R. was fired. The termination letter alleged that S.R. had breached security and manipulated production records in order to generate unearned incentive income for himself and his crew. His conduct was fraudulent, dishonest and constituted theft. Termination was warranted, the employer said.
The Arbitrator disagreed.
S.R. was guilty of misconduct. Despite the fact the company’s efforts to notify workers about the new access restrictions were not what they should have been, S.R. knew, or should have known, that he should not have been accessing the records in the way that he was. More than that, he was less than truthful when he was confronted about his conduct.
No massaging, no fraud
However, the Arbitrator said, there was no evidence to suggest that S.R. had improperly “massaged” production data or had engaged in any fraud.
“Proving the requisite dishonest intent, as opposed to error, mistake or even an honest or misguided desire to help, is an essential element of the offences of fraud or theft that the Company must prove in the present case to establish proper cause for discipline,” the Arbitrator said.
The company was unable to present any definitive evidence to support its suspicions. S.R.’s termination for fraudulent or dishonest conduct could not stand, the Arbitrator said.
However, a six-month suspension without pay was warranted for S.R.’s breach of computer security.
Employers particularly vulnerable
“With computer process technology the norm throughout industry, an employer is particularly vulnerable to employees in [S.R.’s] position, who are trusted to input information into the computer that can affect the financial circumstances of the enterprise, and who have a facility in the technology that often surpasses line management’s knowledge and capability,” the Arbitrator said.
As with cashiers or other employees who handle valuables, employers are entitled to expect workers who handle vital and sensitive computerized production data to conduct themselves with the utmost honesty and trustworthiness, the Arbitrator said.
“Any breach of that expectation can, in appropriate circumstances, so undermine the relationship of trust inherent in the employer’s dependency on the employee in the matter to warrant the employee’s dismissal for cause, even where the employee has not falsified the information entered into the computer system for personal gain.”
Reference: Atlantic Packing Products Ltd. and Graphic Communications Conference/International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 100M. Gordon F. Luborsky — Sole Arbitrator. Mandy Wojcik for the Union. Amanda J. Hunter for the Employer. August 9, 2011. 31 pp.
